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Ports and their regions have experienced at least a century of crisis from wars (e.g., World War I and II), technological change (e.g., container-
ization and information and computer technology), political change (e.g., end of the Cold War and liberalization of commerce and trade in countries
like China and India) and globalization.  As such ports have needed to adjust to these conditions to maintain their competitiveness.  They have done
this by adapting their physical and institutional infrastructures and the adoption of new technologies.  In this paper it is argued however that institu-
tional adaptation is the most important way in which ports have changed in pursuit of sustained competitiveness.  The paper defines institutions in
keeping with the view of the new institutional economists and develops an institutional typology for framing the analyses of four case studies of ports
and/or their regions that faced crisis conditions.  The case studies include an analysis of the problems and responses made by the ports and then an
institutional examination and evaluation of the adjustment process pursued.  Conclusions are made as working hypotheses about t he process of
institutional adjustment to competitiveness crises of ports and their regions and directions for future research are presented.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ports and port processes are major infrastructure
components in the transport network that enables trade.
Historically the core functions of ports have been trans-
shipment and value addition that increasingly tended to
agglomerate at these break of bulk locations. Thus, un-
derstanding and dealing with barriers to trade and related
port functions are important for the maintenance of port
and national competitiveness. Such barriers are of three
types: physical or infrastructure barriers, regulatory bar-
riers and market-induced barriers1.  While this typology is
inclusive it is necessary to expand the regulatory category
to encompass the broader concept of institutions as regu-
lations are only one type of institutional constraint. For
example, cultural traits and values may also be barriers to
adjustment.  The focus in this paper is on the institutional
constraints that slow and hinder ways in which ports re-
spond to threats to their competitiveness, in short, to cri-
ses.
Institutions are here defined as social rule structures
(for example, regulations, constitutions, values and cul-
tural traits) that facilitate the maintenance and adjustment
of social, economic and commercial processes2.  More
specifically well developed institutions reduce transaction
costs and thereby facilitate commerce and trade.  How-
ever, when institutional systems become too extensive they
may create undue transaction costs (diseconomies of scale
and scope) and thus hinder commerce and trade. As such,
competitiveness may be viewed as an increasing function
of institutional infrastructure up to some threshold after
which competitiveness decreases because the context is
so rule bound as to constrain action.  In short, conceptu-
ally we can envision an ideal level of institutional infra-
structure but only when an equilibrium or equilibrium
seeking situation exists.  Ports and other trade support-
ing infrastructure have been continually confronted with
significant changes in market conditions making it nec-
essary for continual and significant institutional adjust-
ment as well as physical infrastructure adjustment.  Below
four case studies are presented that illustrate institutional
adjustment undertaken by ports, and their regions, and
hinterlands as they addressed competitiveness crises.
2. PORTS AND CRISES
Ports faced continued crisis situations throughout
the 20th Century beginning with the need to meet the huge
capacity demand that was required in many European,
Japanese and North American ports during the First
World War and then again during the Second World War.
The containerization revolution in sea transport in the
1950s and 1960s required a new vision of how ports
would operate and with it massive reinvestment in ports,
port facilities and their harbor areas all over the world3.
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Further, deindustrialization and the emergence of the in-
formation or knowledge age in the latter part of the 20th
Century threatened the powerful status ports had acquired
as large vertical integrated and interlinked concentrations
of value added manufacturing and that defined the foun-
dations of the industrial age.  As the industrial age waned
Seaports were no longer necessarily the dominate nodes
that linked people, countries and regions, high value com-
modities and cargos.  The comparative advantages of
ports as production locations weakened and in some cases
were nearly lost4. Globalization, mass markets and the
opening up of new markets as a consequence of political
change (for example, the former Soviet Republics, China
and India) have increasingly made the vertically orga-
nized structures of the past including the traditional port
obsolete in the face of the more horizontal and networked
flexible production systems that now define their viabil-
ity5. Further, cargo that formerly moved through and by
ports is now increasingly carried by air, trucks and fast
trains that often bypass seaports and are logistically de-
pendent on the information technology of today’s ad-
vanced communication systems6. Today competition is
stronger than ever in an era of rapid communication and
increasingly one that begs for support of demand respon-
sive manufacturing and just-in-time inventory require-
ments that reduce if not eliminate the need for storage
and warehousing at the port. Finally, the 21st Century ush-
ered in security and safety issues at a scale that had not
previously been envisioned.  In general, the comparative
advantage of ports underwent redefinition during the last
part of the 20th Century due to globalization, structural
economic and political change, and terrorism.
The purpose of this rather long description of the
crises that ports have experienced over the past century
is important because institutional change rarely occurs
without a crisis.  Adjustments to manage such crises are
usually required because the institutional framework at
any specific time is analogous to the view that generals
often take when facing a new confrontation or war; that
the existing strategy or institutional infrastructure is appro-
priate for the last crisis but obsolete for the current one7.
New strategy and institutions or institutional change are
required to adapt to changed circumstances and thus to
address new crises.  Thus institutional analysis most prop-
erly focuses either on describing how institutions explain
social, economic or political behavior in times of only in-
cremental change or how they change to address a cri-
sis, and the fruitfulness of the outcome.  In this paper the
latter perspective is the focus.
These premises in and of themselves are far from
serving as a theory of institutional change but do offer
insight into two patterns that are consistent with experi-
ence: institutional change is motivated by crises and the
existing institutional structure in the face of a crisis is un-
likely to be adequate.  But, the expansion of these pre-
cepts into a theoretical framework must wait for the
drafting of another paper.
The purpose here is to examine specific crises faced
by ports, and their regions and hinterlands (including har-
bors and related factors such as industry, land use and
surface transportation), and the institutional dynamics that
has evolved to address them.  As noted above, there are
at least three types of barriers to change in the face of
crises.  In this paper it is argued that institutional rather
than physical or technical barriers are often the most dif-
ficult to manage and thus the major factors that delay the
adjustment process.  Further, technologies for addressing
physical barriers are usually available and thus rarely pose
the primary reason for delays in adjusting the port and
harbor system to changed conditions.  Market and com-
petitive dynamics are treated as crises or motivations for
change as well as barriers to competitiveness.  With this
view then physical, technical and institutional elements
serve as the tools of change.
The paper begins with a discussion of the physical,
technical and institutional barriers to port development.
This is followed with a more refined definition of insti-
tutions and a presentation of an institutional typology and
methodology that provides a framework or platform for
the analysis to follow. In the next part of the paper four
case study analyses of port crisis adjustment are presented
with the focus placed on the institutional barriers and their
management.  The final part of the paper derives conclu-
sions from the analyses and advocates a broader appli-
cation of the institutional approach for analyzing other
transport related topics and issues.
3. PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO PORT AND
HARBOR DEVELOPMENT
Ports and harbors have been undergoing continu-
ous physical and institutional change for centuries and
more specifically, for the purposes of this paper, since the
invention of containers and container vessels in the 1960s,
followed by de-industrialization and the advance of the
information age and related technology that changed the
nature of seagoing cargo and transport8.  As the container
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revolution unfolded it made the urban core based port in-
frastructure of the early and mid-twentieth century obso-
lete because container shipping required large amounts
of land for transshipment and storage.  The old downtown
docks and terminals became obsolete over a short time
of little more than a decade.  This posed both new oppor-
tunities for port city regions and at the same time a crisis
for the old traditional port operations with the related ob-
solete infrastructure and thus of little use as new container
ports emerged, often far from the city center9.
Today much of the old port infrastructure has been
replaced with new waterfront uses including commercial
and retail functions, recreation, light shipping support
functions (pleasure boat mooring and docking) and other
service functions as well as some transport related ser-
vices (water taxis)10. But there are new challenges both
in the urban and more peripheral parts of the harbor where
the container port functions tend to be found.  These chal-
lenges vary depending on the specific port but include
bridge construction and repair, streamlining of inter-
modal transport and transshipment systems, dock demo-
lition and land use conversion, new land uses, securing
the port, dredging or deepening the harbor to accept larger
vessels so as to remain competitive via gaining scale
economies, managing intergovernmental units, managing
preferences of different groups, managing and defining
the roles of the public and private sector, marketing the
interests of the port and infrastructure financing.  This list
contains both physical and institutional elements or is-
sues in the port, its harbor and hinterland related trans-
portation system.
The physical barriers are related to geography and
geology, technology, land use, transport infrastructure,
water and air quality. While not all of these are neces-
sarily easy to address, most, with perhaps the exception
of land use, are ultimately manageable because the tech-
nology and know how for the most part already exist.
However, this does not hold for institutional barriers such
as preference and vision conflicts regarding the future of
the port, property rights, conflicts of multiple interest
groups, low trust and cooperation levels, regulatory over-
burden, public and private sector interactions, intergov-
ernmental jurisdiction and cooperation, and political
conflict. These issues are the reason that most large scale
port and harbor development projects in the face of crisis
experience excessive delay that may be as long as a gen-
eration to implement11.
4. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
As adopted for this paper, institutions are viewed
as social rule structures that guide behavior2. For ex-
ample, port and harbor transportation is an institution
when we view it from the perspective of the rules that
guide and define the functions of ports and harbors and
the movement of cargo.  A specific port is an organiza-
tion that performs the function of the port, not an insti-
tution as defined herein.  So the analyses to follow focus
on the institutional context of the port and its functions.
In earlier work Stough and Rietveld11 present a
framework for institutional analysis of transport related
issues.  They classify institutions in terms of their dura-
bility (short term and long term) and formality (informal
and formal). For example, values and cultural elements
often are durable or long lasting and thus tend not to
change easily.  Also they are often informal in nature.
Constitutions, as the embodiment of deep political, cul-
tural and social values of societies are likewise durable
but formal. Conventions such as practices that are not
codified but open to change or discretion such as rules
that are adopted as best practices are relatively easy to
change or are subject to discretion.  Such practices are
informal and short term in nature. At the same time there
are minor regulations, for example, various land use regu-
lations that are formal but flexible (e.g., the granting of
zoning variances) that can change over relatively short
periods due to no more than changes in political leader-
ship. For example, there are many cases where growth
control measures have been adopted and codified only to
be relaxed or removed with the election of a new group
of political leaders and vice versa.  In sum, institutions
can be classified in terms of their formalness and their
durability as illustrated in Fig. 1. Williamson12 divides
his topology of institutions more finely into four levels:
informal institutions that include values and cultural prac-
tices; formal institutions such as high level laws and stat-
utes like constitutions; governance institutions including
Fig. 1  Type of institutions
  Less Durable More durable
  Short term Longer term
 Easy to change More difficult to change
 Formal Many land use  Constitutions
 regulations
  
 Informal Adopted practices Values, Culture
 conventions
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the regulating infrastructure – formal and informal that
are shorter in term.
Stough and Rietveld examine the methodological
and data problems that underlie institutional analysis11.
These include complexity, difficult to quantify, context
comparability in comparative analysis, and data availabil-
ity in a form enabling quantification. Further, including
institutional variables in the regression and quantitative
models that are much more common in most transport
research is difficult.  Consequently, methodologies such
as participant observation, executive interviewing, survey
questionnaires that are more familiar in the fields of an-
thropology, psychology, sociology, history and political
science, are likely to be more fruitful for institutional
analysis in the transport field. Yet it may be possible in
transport studies to include institutions as categorical vari-
ables in regression modeling and to build in qualitative
institutional constraints in optimization models. In fact,
the Charleston, South Carolina case presented below il-
lustrates this approach.
5. CASE STUDY ANALYSES
Four case studies are presented below. The four
cases were not selected at random, rather they were se-
lected because crises drove the need for both physical and
institutional infrastructure change. Three of these exam-
ine problems involved in infrastructure changes aimed at
improving competitiveness and environmental and qual-
ity of life fit.  One illustrates the use of a multi-objective
land use model in supporting conflict management over
the use of land along a navigable waterway.
The first case relates to the Port of Los Angeles/Long
Beach and the problems this port experienced in cargo
shipment by rail across the city to the interior of the U.S
in the 1990s.  The second is an analysis of the Port of
Kaohsiung, Taiwan and harbor development decision
making and an intergovernmental relations conflict over
the management of the port and harbor related functions.
The third case is concerned with managing a development
and wetlands protection conflict in Charleston, South
Carolina, USA.  The final case concerns intergovernmen-
tal issues in expanding the capacity of the Woodrow Wil-
son Bridge across the Potomac River in the U.S. national
capital region.  The issues focus on interest group con-
flicts, financing, intergovernmental relations and prefer-
ence conflicts.  Each case study begins with a description
of the problem and situation and solutions achieved or the
lack thereof.  This is followed by an institutional analy-
sis of the case.
5.1 The port of Los Angeles/Long Beach
The Los Angeles/Long Beach port is one of the
largest ports in the world. It serves as the main port an-
choring the land bridge from west to east across the U.S.
Consequently, vast amounts of cargo must move to and
from the port along the Alameda Corridor across various
political jurisdictions in Los Angeles County resulting in
considerable disruption of urban traffic flow and signifi-
cant environmental and quality of life impacts13.  Port
traffic is supported by three railroad companies using four
routes that cross the region in the Alameda Corridor.  In
this corridor the railroad lines crossed streets at 200 lo-
cations resulting in considerable traffic congestion, safety,
noise and environmental impacts. In sum, seven cities and
Los Angeles County were impacted.
Port, transport and community leaders saw a need
to reduce the railroad crossings.  Eventually they formed
the Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority (ACTA)
in 198914.  The ACTA included 7 city governments, 3
national scale railroad companies, and federal, state, lo-
cal and regional government agencies. As such the ACTA
was formed as a public-private partnership to reduce the
railroad crossings and improve traffic flow and safety.
ACTA was created under a Joint Powers Agreement
(JPA)15. A JPA is an agreement on the part of participat-
ing jurisdictions to share in the development of a project
and its cost according to provisions in the agreement.
The goal of the ACTA was to build a consensus
among its members to achieve congestion mitigation and
reduce the environmental and quality of life impacts16.
While there was broad involvement of the stakeholders
(members) there was considerable disagreement over the
design due to conflicting views.  At the same time stud-
ies were conducted that showed that traffic would grow
regardless of any action that might be taken and that
achieving the goals of ACTA would have a positive im-
pact at the local, state and national levels.
Initially the ACTA with its large core membership
was found to have such diverse interests and representa-
tion that it was unable to act. It was decided to reduce
the 16 members of its board including all 7 cities in the
Corridor to 7 members. These members included the Los
Angeles and Long Beach Ports, Los Angeles and Long
Beach city councils, Los Angeles County, the Metropoli-
tan Transportation Authority and two other agencies.
This required court action and tireless negotiation, and
when eventually accomplished the resulting agreement
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE SUSTAINABILITY OF CROSS-BORDER TRANSPORT
34 • IATSS RESEARCH Vol.29 No.2, 2005
granted the cities review and approval rights on plans and
mitigation grants (necessary for land acquisition and off
setting costs to individuals and commercial establish-
ments that were to be impacted by the changes)15.
The ACTA created a 10-mile long inter-modal
project13. The design included a 33 foot deep trench for
rail and 29 flyovers. It was a $2.4 billion project, a mega-
project by most definitions17.  Funding the initiative was
of course a major problem, however ACTA as a Joint
Powers Agreement (JPA) under U.S. law meant that it
was underpinned by formal institutions. Under the rules
of a JPA the ACTA was empowered to raise and coordi-
nate funding for the effort.  The funding included:
55 percent from revenue bonds,
18 percent federal government loans (repaid by fees
on corridor use & containers),
18 percent from the ports,
8 percent from the State of California (state grants),
5 percent from other sources.
The funding was amassed and administered by the Los
Angeles county Metropolitan Transport Authority on be-
half of the ACTA.
Several lessons can be gleaned from this case.  First,
informal institutions underpin the success of this example.
American Exceptionalism18 is a perspective that among
other things argues that leadership for community and
public projects usually comes from outside of govern-
ment.  This occurs because the U.S. culture has very weak
political institutions maintained in its constitution that
ensure separation of power (among branches of govern-
ments and between the states and the federal government)
and intricate other power blocking or leveling elements.
It is for this reason that leadership for projects like the
Alameda Corridor tends to come from outside of gov-
ernment or from government in collaboration with other
groups such as the railroads and community groups.  The
Alameda Corridor project was a community oriented ini-
tiative that included government but was not led by gov-
ernment. In short, we can interpret the approach adopted
as directly related to U.S. values that create and main-
tain weak government institutions. Consequently, action
solutions to community and public problems most often
come from outside of government with elected officials
and public servants often following along in support.
Formal institutions provided important input to the
outcome.  If the ACTA had not been created as a Joint
Powers Agreement under California Statutes it would not
have had the authority to lead the process and to design
and implement, and for that matter guide the way the
funds were raised and spent. Without this status or a simi-
lar one (e.g., interstate compact) the project would have
been much more difficult to achieve and manage (see the
Woodrow Wilson Bridge case below).
Shorter term formal institutions also played a role.
The ACTA governance structure was a formal one created
under the Joint Powers Agreement. However, because the
ACTA was envisioned as a temporary organization to
achieve specific but limited goals it did not have the du-
rability and the level of formality found in government
bodies such as states or cities.  Moreover, the governance
structure was flexible as witnessed by the reduction of
the membership that occurred to ensure a more action-
able organization.
Short term and quasi-formal institutions were also
important for the Corridor project regarding the alloca-
tion of resources. The construction of the trench for the
railroad line to and from the port across the Los Angeles
urban landscape and the 29 flyovers were highly disrup-
tive of the existing land uses despite the goal to create a
more functional and livable urban environment. Conse-
quently, there were significant impacts to individuals and
businesses and that required compensation.  The ACTA
arranged grants from higher levels of government to the
cities to provide this compensation. Without such com-
pensation the project would not have occurred.
5.2 Kaohsiung, Taiwan port and harbor
The Port of Kaohsiung is one of the five largest con-
tainer ports in the world.  While its volume and the value
of its cargo have declined relative to some other ports
over the past ten years (it was ranked third in 1995) it is
still one of the largest in the world.  The port is located
on the Southwest coast of Taiwan and enjoys a particu-
larly good physical port with easy access to the sea and
to the downtown part of the city of Kaohsiung19.
Until the early 2000s the port of Kaohsiung oper-
ated under leadership from the Provincial Taiwan gov-
ernment with some additional oversight from the national
Taiwan government particularly with respect to defense.
The goals of the modern port which was established in
the early 20th Century when Taiwan was under Japanese
rule were to maximize revenue from port services, sup-
port industrial development, serve as infrastructure for
national defense and as an element of the national trans-
portation infrastructure.  The port is linked to the national
transportation infrastructure by rail and road and the
Kaohsiung International Airport is located nearby.  But
the goals of the provincial and national governments were
only partly coincident and complementary to those of the
IATSS RESEARCH Vol.29 No.2, 2005 • 35
INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO PORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND HARBOR DEVELOPMENT R. R. STOUGH
local Kaohsiung government20 which holds provincial
government status in Taiwan along with Taipei6.
Certainly the port functions were a compliment to
the City in that it was and is a source of significant em-
ployment both directly and indirectly in the factories and
plants supported by the port.  Further, the security func-
tions which are near pure public goods are also of great
benefit to the City.  However, the goal of maximizing rev-
enues from port functions and services was at odds with
other interest groups' preferences and objectives. Revenue
maximization meant that the waterfront was totally de-
voted to port and industrial uses by the 1990s, partly as
a result of Taiwan’s rapid drive to development that un-
folded over recent decades.  Consequently, water front
access for residents for fishing and recreation was not
possible except in a very limited way that was inconsis-
tent with the experience of residents in coastal cities
throughout the developed world10.  Nor was it available
for non-industrial commercial uses.  Further, neither the
port nor the harbor area had been integrated into the broad
spectrum of city life20.  Finally, as a consequence of the
narrow thinking focused on maximizing the value of the
port as a revenue generator it had not been well integrated
into the national transportation infrastructure. This meant
that its role as an element in the supply chain for indus-
try all over Taiwan was limited and posed an impediment
for Taiwan’s national development6.
The port was removed from Provincial government
control in the early 2000s thus creating an opportunity
for the first time for new and diverse interests to register
their preferences.  For sure traditional port and industrial
interests had been and were represented and for sure the
revenue generation function was still important but not
as a “cash cow” to support Provincial goals that were
often not even transport or development related20.  The
potential for using the harbor for recreation, for improv-
ing environmental conditions, for commercial and resi-
dential uses, and for building a strong inter-modal
transportation hub were recognized.  The City leadership
and its residents have been planning and implementing
changes in port and harbor usage to include new and ex-
panded functions for the past several years.
Institutions played an important role in the Kaohsiung
port and harbor example.  Command and control gover-
nance under Provincial government control mitigated
against the leadership and residents of Kaohsiung being
able to envision the potential of the Port and its water-
front.  This was the case in Kaohsiung until the change
in the early 2000s when the process of governance was
altered to enable participation in the governance of the
Port region and to learn that new uses could improve gen-
eral living quality. Formal and durable institutions existed
that gave the Provincial government a mandate to gov-
ern the port and its uses.  That this regulation had existed
from the founding of the Republic of China and was thus
sanctioned by the national government meant that it was
durable and resistant to change. That is why changing the
control structure to a leading role for Kaohsiung City took
so long.  Once control was passed to the City less em-
phasis was placed on revenue generation and more on
broader economic development and its integration into the
national development plan, quality of life and broader
social objectives. That new goals and implementation
plans could be initiated so quickly is an illustration of how
strong the former command and control governance sys-
tem was but how rapidly change occurs when a relatively
high level institution is changed.
5.3 The Charleston, South Carolina, U.S.A. case
Charleston South Carolina is located on the South-
east coast of the United States about 500 miles south of
Washington, D.C. and about 300 miles to the east of At-
lanta, Georgia.  It is a medium sized port with easy ac-
cess to the Atlantic Ocean (it is about 5 miles across the
Charleston Harbor to where ships can enter the Atlantic
Ocean).  The harbor has several long deep estuaries
formed by rivers that flow to the harbor. One of these is
the Cooper River which is the longest and deepest (navi-
gable for 22 miles inland) and enters on the north side
of the City. The shallower and shorter Ashley River en-
ters to the south.  Near where the Cooper River enters
the harbor another estuary named the Wando River en-
ters.  The City of Charleston is located on a peninsula
between the Cooper and Ashley Rivers.  Charlestonians
describe where they live as north of the Cooper, South
of the Ashley or in the city – on the peninsula.  A nuclear
submarine fleet is based out of the Charleston port as well
as other naval shipping. The military related part of the
port is located several miles up the Cooper River estu-
ary.  Little of the old port located on the Charleston city
waterfront remains today but there are several small ter-
minals there.  A container terminal was built on the pen-
insula between the Cooper and Wando Rivers in the
1970s and 1980s.  This is the major focus of activity for
the modern port of Charleston21.
Charleston is a high amenity sunbelt metropolitan
region.  It has a subtropical climate and access to great
sport fishing and beaches but it is best known for its heri-
tage. Because Charleston grew little over the 100 years
following the U.S. Civil War its downtown area failed
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almost totally to experience urban renewal that redefined
many cities in the U.S. following World War II.  Conse-
quently, in the 1960s and 1970s as heritage preservation
became an important national goal Charleston began to
flourish because it had thousands of dwellings built over
three centuries that while in rather poor condition were
still standing and functional. Today Charleston has more
structures on the National Historic Record than any other
city in the U.S.  Thus it has a well developed heritage
and cultural tourism industry.
As a consequence of the heritage identity of the re-
gion it is a place where maintenance of environmental and
heritage integrity are strong and related preferences play
a strong role in the enactment and maintenance of qual-
ity of life and environmental quality policy.  Because the
region became highly attractive as a tourist attraction tied
to heritage and the quality of the outdoor environment it
is no surprise that the conflict between growth manage-
ment and environment interests and developers is strong.
This has and continues to be a powerful attribute of in-
stitutional life in Charleston.  Like the Los Angeles and
the Kaohsiung cases, Charleston also has a complex in-
tergovernmental situation. The metropolitan region is
composed of three counties (Charleston, Berkeley and
Dorchester) and several city jurisdictions including the
City of Charleston, the City of North Charleston (located
inland about 10 miles but abutting on the Cooper River
in the vicinity of the naval complex on the River) and
others such as Sullivan’s Island, Folly Beach, The Isles
of Palm, Summerville and Edisto Beach. Further, because
it has several rivers that form the harbor and a number
of beach communities that lie beyond the U.S. Inter-
coastal waterway that stretches along the coast for about
30 miles north and south of Charleston, a number of state
agencies (e.g., South Carolina Coastal Council) and fed-
eral agencies (U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of
Defense – Navy, National Oceanic and Space Administra-
tion, National Endowment for the Arts, Environmental
Protection Agency) as well as a focus of organizations
of national scope like the Heritage Foundation and Na-
tional Wildlife Federation) have a role in local affairs.
Because of the adversarial relationship between
growth control and growth advocates and because of the
rich organization environment in Charleston, public
policy and decision making regarding growth decisions
is complicated, complex and difficult21.  For example,
wetland maintenance along the navigable waterways has
been in conflict with development. To wit, the expansion
of the Port of Charleston to the container terminal site
between the Cooper and the Wando Rivers threatened
large acres of wetlands as the area contains one of the
largest single concentrations of wetlands on the east coast
of the U.S21.  Other development interests face the issue
of wetland protection whenever projects on or adjacent
the waterways are proposed.  In short, there is an extreme
and deep seated distrust between development interests
and heritage, amenity maintenance and environmental
protectionist interests (this conclusion is supported by
surveys of leaders and government officials in Charles-
ton21 as reported in Stough and Whittington, 1986).
To help inform the waterfront land use decision
making process, a multi-objective mathematical program-
ming model22 for estimating the tradeoffs between devel-
oped waterfront land and protected wetlands was
constructed and calibrated for the land along the navi-
gable waterways in the Charleston region21.
The details of the model, analyses and mapped re-
sults can be found in Stough and Whittington21 and thus
are described only in summary form here. First, the model
analyses showed the likely conversion of land to devel-
oped uses would occur much sooner in remote parts of
the region than local planners and developers thought.
Second, the large area of wetlands in the lower Cooper
and Wando estuaries served to direct development else-
where.  Third, little commercial development was antici-
pated in the Ashley estuary until the later stages of land
conversion because the channel depth was significantly
less than in the other estuaries including some far re-
moved from the Charleston Harbor and related estuaries
described above along the inter-coastal waterway in more
remote parts of the region.  In short, some unexpected
results occurred.
The results of the model runs were presented to a
group of regional planners and developers.  They were
asked to discuss the usefulness of the results. There were
also surveys that sought to measure before and after the
meeting views.  The panel agreed that the conflict in the
region over wetlands preserved and development of the
land along navigable waterways was extreme.  They
stated that the forecasted conversion patterns were not
fully anticipated. In fact, they found some of the results
provocative and stimulated debate over plausibility and
thus were educational. The exercise sensitized officials
to the fact that growth and development pressure and de-
velopment policies in the various jurisdictions were not
independent from one another21. This latter conclusion
was based on the second run of the model that constrained
the amount of conversion allowed in Charleston County
thus forcing it to other parts of the region in Berkeley
County after a conversion threshold was reached. Indeed
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one of the jurisdictions was considering growth control
legislation at the time of the analysis that would nearly
eliminate all conversion of waterfront or waterway land.
This study illustrates in a modest way how analytical sup-
port can be provided to help inform and better manage
institutional conflict in harbor and port development set-
tings, particularly dynamic ones under the crisis of de-
velopment pressure.
It is useful to take a moment to reflect on the role
of analytical methods for supporting management of in-
stitutional issues.  This case used multi-objective pro-
gramming land use modeling but there are many other
techniques and methods that have and can be used. These
include: faster than real time simulation and modeling,
GIS and space-time modeling, transport modeling, port
and harbor impact models, financial modeling, competi-
tion modeling (e.g. game theory approaches), environ-
mental modeling, management modeling and strategic
planning (see Stough and Whittington21 for more discus-
sion of this).
5.4 The Wilson Bridge case study
The Wilson Bridge spans the Potomac River estu-
ary in the U.S. National Capital Region and is a critical
link on the Interstate Highway 95 expressway that serves
as the major surface transport roadway traversing the east
cost of the U.S. from Miami Florida to the Canadian bor-
der.  Traffic volumes on this roadway are large in most
places but particularly intense in the National Capital re-
gion because the region is one of the most congested in
the U.S. with considerable commuter and cross region
traffic complimented with a large volume of flow through
traffic.  In short, it is one of the most congested areas in
the U.S. The background for this case draws upon four
technical reports23-26.
The Wilson Bridge is nearly 40 years old, about a
half mile long but is the centerpiece in a 5 mile corridor
that extends from the bridge into Virginia and Maryland,
has three lanes of traffic in both directions and is in ex-
tremely poor condition (Haynes, et. al.,2001).  In fact
parts of the bridge periodically fall into the estuary.  The
bridge is under the jurisdiction or control of Washington
D.C. (the U.S. federal district) but traffic enters the bridge
from two states, Maryland and Virginia meaning that re-
sponsibility and control for egress and ingress belongs to
them. Thus, the bridge is jointly managed by these three
governments. Further, because it is also a draw bridge and
spans a navigable waterway, the U.S. Coast Guard has
jurisdiction over water traffic that moves beneath the
bridge. In summary, the bridge lies in a complicated in-
tergovernmental situation that involves control issues
across the federal District of Columbia, two states and
various federal agencies, and thus provides the most com-
plicated intergovernmental situation observed among the
four case studies.
It was recognized some 20 years ago that a new
bridge was needed because traffic demand analyses
showed that insufficient capacity existed and, later be-
cause of a failure to act in a timely fashion, the fact that
the bridge was falling apart.  A 12 to 16 lane bridge was
needed to absorb expected growth in demand and the cost
was estimated to be about $1.5 billion (the bridge is un-
der construction now and the cost is expected to be more
than $2 billion).
More than twenty years passed while the various
jurisdictions debated how many lanes were needed, where
the funding would come from and who would take
responsibility for ensuring the bridge was replaced.
Unlike the Alameda Corridor project no ACTA type au-
thority was formed.  Planning was eventually carried out
cooperatively between the states of Maryland and Vir-
ginia and the District of Columbia but continued to be
problematic given the different cultures and governance
structures of these jurisdictions.  Without an inter-gov-
ernmental authority to build cooperation and provide
leadership the project experienced considerable problems
in dealing with a complex of interest group conflicts. For
example, the west end of the bridge is located in the City
of Alexandria, Virginia.  Alexandria is an old city dat-
ing to the settlement of the Washington region in the 17th
Century and thus has a historic patina created by its old
structures (to some extent it is similar in this respect to
Charleston, South Carolina).  Thus, the Alexandria com-
munity objected on the basis of heritage and scenic im-
pacts of the plan to build a much larger bridge to replace
the three lane Wilson bridge.  Further, financing issues
arose, although there was agreement among the three sub-
national governments that the federal government should
pay most if not all the cost.  Finally, serious control is-
sues arose between the two states, the District of Colum-
bia and various federal agencies (e.g., Coast Guard) given
the location of the bridge.
Today the new bridge is under construction with
most of the pilings and foundation infrastructure now in
place but it will not be completed or operational until
200827.  As a consequence, congestion management is
still a problem and it is a daily burden to manage the
bottleneck the bridge construction creates for commut-
ers and flow through traffic. Given this, it is instructive
to mention several institutional issues that could provide
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some guidance for similar projects in the future.
Deep seated American values appear to have played
a role in the delays to the replacement of the bridge. Weak
government institutions and strong individualist tenden-
cies mark the American experience as noted above as
codified in the American Exceptionalism perspective.
Control issues, financing responsibility, cooperation prob-
lems and a lack of cross jurisdiction leadership all serve
to underscore how the traditional American values of in-
dividualism and weak government leadership played them-
selves out in this case.  Community leadership emerged
slowly if at all and only through long intertwined discus-
sions did any trust at all evolve among representatives of
the two states and the District.  Eventually it did develop
to a point that the project could be designed and aspects
of the contracting allocated to the different parties.
The City of Alexandria’s concerns and interests
were not fully addressed28. The bridge being constructed
is perceived by residents of Alexandria as creating sig-
nificant indirect (psychological and community identity)
costs as the new bridge will be much higher than the ex-
isting bridge and thus more visible. Finally, the project
has not been well integrated into the development along
the Potomac estuary although some progress seems to be
emerging now that the new bridge is under construction.
However, it is such a large project that it is in some ways
driving development decisions along the estuary itself
because it constrains development possibilities in the vi-
cinity of the bridge.
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned
from the Wilson Bridge case is that one way or another
such projects will be built if the need is ultimately per-
ceived to be sufficiently large. However, without a for-
mal organization in multiple jurisdiction settings being
responsible for coordinating the multiple interests and re-
lated problems such a project will take much longer than
necessary.  If an ACTA type organization for the Wil-
son Bridge project had been formed and charged with the
responsibility of providing leadership for the project, and
assigned responsibility for managing the financing, plan-
ning and construction, a much more focused and timely
effort would likely have occurred and time would likely
have been saved, the interests of various groups would
likely have been better served and cost would have been
less.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
While it is not possible to generalize on the basis
of the four case studies, it is possible to identify some
patterns that are consistent with experience (and some that
are inconsistent) and thus can serve as working hypoth-
eses for future research and perhaps practice.  These pat-
terns are discussed from the perspective of the two-by-two
institutional framework outlined in Fig. 1 that classifies
institutions as formal/informal and long term vs. relatively
short term.
Reference to American Exceptionalism18 has been
made in three case studies. This perspective argues that
the way the U.S. was formed as a country resulted in pro-
tection of individual rights (strong individualist values),
weak government institutions and a rural community/co-
operation orientation that together created strong non
profit institutions or associations that often provided lead-
ership for community problem solving.  This community
leadership approach, as Lipset notes, was observed with
fascination by de Toqueville during his extended visit and
tour of the U.S. in the mid-Nineteenth Century18.  The three
American case studies are all consistent with this perspec-
tive as these values can be viewed as significantly influ-
encing approaches and outcomes. For the Alameda
Corridor project the formation of the ACTA to provide
organizational leadership and implement the project was
consistent with the community approach and with the
weak government institutions claim of American
Exceptionalism. One also finds in the archives of the ex-
tended debates over compensation for individuals and
groups that were impacted by the project strong individu-
alist tendencies.  The Charleston and Wilson Bridge cases
on the other hand might be viewed as exhibiting the down
side of strong individualist and weak government insti-
tutions because of the deep polarization that occurred
among those with standing and the difficulty governments
had in providing leadership for guiding and managing
the major actors. In short, all three U.S. based examples
support the view that government institutions are rela-
tively weak and that for leadership to be effective and
timely it often must come from outside of government
for planning and implementing major projects. This does
not mean that once leadership is provided that govern-
ment does not participate, quite the contrary as shown
most positively in the Alameda Corridor but also in the
Wilson Bridge case.
The Kaohsiung Taiwan port and harbor case is a
good example of how somewhat durable institutions like
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the law that assigned the management of the port to the
Taiwan Provincial Government can change and quite rap-
idly. It may be the case that such large scale institutional
change occurs more easily under unitary-like forms of
government as is mostly the case in Taiwan.  With the
ushering in of a new political regime in the early 2000s,
the power of the Provincial Government was seriously
reduced and according to some observers essentially
eliminated.  This made it possible and necessary to re-
assign the function of managing the Kaohsiung Port to
other units of government; however, it did not necessar-
ily eliminate an essentially command and control orien-
tation of the Taiwan central government. Nevertheless,
with this change a set of other relatively short and inter-
mediate term institutions changed also. Informal institu-
tions in Kaoshiung such as preferences, planning and
rules for planning for the future of the port became more
open to the influence of expanded information and edu-
cation and in turn were modified.  Through this change
in responsibility and authority the intergovernmental con-
flict between the Provincial Government and Kaohsiung
City Government was partly resolved. The pattern or les-
son here is that the locus of institutional responsibility and
leadership changed from one level of government to an-
other in a way that put the responsibility at the geographic
location of the activity. This observation along with much
other evidence from around the world suggests that when-
ever possible, authority should be devolved to the low-
est level and to the location where the activity occurs.
The caveat here is that sometimes the function is also part
of a broader responsibility, for example, with a pure pub-
lic good like the defense function of the port, and thus
may need to be openly shared and not managed indirectly
through laws and regulations.
The third pattern or lesson comes from the Charles-
ton, South Carolina case and focuses on the role of ana-
lytical support for managing problems when deep seated
distrust and conflict exist over the goals of development
and maintenance of environmental and heritage integrity.
Modeling the land use conversion process as a multi-ob-
jective programming model and presenting the results of
wetland protection and conversion under different as-
sumptions helped inform the contesting parties of the con-
sequences of different levels of protection and conversion
and served to help create a better understanding of and
need for consensus formation.  It would appear that con-
sensus formation and decision-making that is better in-
formed analytically would improve not only the
efficiency of the processes but the quality of outcomes.
However, the devil’s advocate position might be that in
a litigious society like the U.S. more information leads
to more dimensions for debate thus deepening conflict.
This hypothesis needs further examination.
Additional research is needed to further test these
hypothesized patterns and lessons for port and harbor de-
velopment policy and planning and institutional change.
In particular, a more systematic study of the way in which
longer term durable formal and informal institutions and
shorter term less durable institutions operate in the port
and harbor decision process.  Hypotheses regarding the
influence of the type of intergovernmental relations and
the relation of that to governance processes need to be
more specifically formulated and tested. It would be an
interesting exercise to historically investigate the Ameri-
can Exceptionalism thesis across a larger sample of case
histories of ports and harbors in the U.S and match the
sample of U.S. ports with similar ones in other countries.
The importance of the comparative element of the analy-
sis stems from Lipset’s argument that our understanding
of institutions can best be obtained from comparative
analysis18.  Such investigation could provide a deeper
understanding of how informal yet deep seated cultural
traits impact a variety of processes like consensus forma-
tion, decision making and rent seeking.  It would also pro-
vide a bench mark against which to compare experiences
of ports and harbors in other countries.  This point is im-
portant because of the rapid globalization the world has
experienced during the last decade or two and the related
need for a deeper understanding of port and harbor deci-
sion processes.
Finally the case study analyses were selected be-
cause of the belief that institutional variables are most
important in the face of crisis and that institutional change
is necessary for the major adjustments (physical and in-
stitutional) that are often required to mange the negative
impacts of change and to capture opportunities that cri-
sis situations often offer. Further analysis is needed to test
the thesis that crisis drives change, however.  Addition-
ally, despite the fact that each case analysis of this paper
showed that existing institutions were less well developed
than needed to facilitate the adjustment process, the the-
sis that the institutional infrastructure is inadequate be-
cause it is obsolete needs further consideration.
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